Question For the Brits on My F'lsit: Exactly How Bollocks is That?

[capri0mni]

Every Saturday, I listen to a news comedy radio quiz show called wait, Wait...Don't Tell Me!. You can listen to the segments of the show, on the site, btw.

And in the first segment, one of the answers to one of the questions was "The Downing Street Memo," and the host explained:

([. . .] = audience laughter, and jokes from the panalists, cut for the sake of readablity)

People have argued about this, but some say the 'smoking gun,' if you wll, is a sentance in the memo that says that the White how was (quote) '...fixing the intelligence about Iraq's WMD's around the policy.' And some of the defenders (this is true) of the White House, on this score, say: Oh, no, no, no! Don't you understand? The word 'fixing,' in Britain, doesn't mean what it does here. [. . .] It doesn't mean, you know, "faking it," or, "changing it." It means affixing [. . .] adhering, attatching...

Really now, is this claim true? Not that I don't trust the patriotic defenders of our president, [:::ahem -- cough!:::] you understand, but you guys really are the experts on this... it being your own language, and all...

Comments

[gordon-r-d.livejournal.com]

Delted previous comment due to sudden "D'oh!" moment when I realised I myself was suffering from testicular verbosity.

It can mean both over here. I'd really need the full text of the quote to tell you as it's mostly down to the context. But he is at least talking bollocks about it not meaning what it does in the US, it does, as well as meaning the other thing.

So, only teeny wee bollocks, maybe like a tin of Campbell's Meatballs. Yes.

[indefatigable42.livejournal.com]

I've heard "fix" used to mean "attach". I don't know if it's British.

Regardless of what it means, "attaching the intelligence around the policy" and "tampering with the intelligence around the policy" mean completely different things (not to mention that the former is extremely sloppy).

With the complete memo, it should be clear from context which one was meant, because they're two different kinds of verbs.

[capriuni.livejournal.com]

As it so happens, I'm on the Democracy for America mailing list, and got sent the complete text of "the memo" last week. Here it is (I've put the key paragraph in italics):

---
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72-hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
[Continued in the next reply, due to LJ's character limit]

[capriuni.livejournal.com]

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan
for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with
Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions: [snipped, to fit LJ's length limit]